India will soon sign an “Additional protocol” with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) for inspection of its civilian nuclear plants.
By signing the additional protocol to the IAEA Safeguards Agreement, India will pursue a major nuclear partnership with the United States.
In 2009, after India's civil nuclear deal with the US, the IAEA had approved an additional protocol to clear the way for the Nuclear Supply Group (NSG) to grant India a waiver for civilian nuclear trade with other countries.
The ratification indicates that NDA government led by Prime Minister Narendra Modi wants to bolster strategic and trade ties with the United States when he meets President Barack Obama in Washington in September this year.
It will even fulfils India’s commitment anchored in the Indo-U.S. joint statement of July 2005, which stated unambiguously that New Delhi would conclude “an additional protocol” with the IAEA.
Advantages of signing Additional protocol to the IAEA Safeguards Agreement
- It will help India towards separating civilian and military nuclear operations and help to unlock billions of dollars in US led investment in new nuclear generation capacity.
- It will enhance transparency of India’s nuclear infrastructure which can be leveraged to boost energy security and lift international confidence in terms of Nuclear Security.
- It will open paths to countries such as Japan, France and the United States to enhance the level of their civilian nuclear trade with India.
The safeguards agreement with the IAEA covered 20 facilities that include's
- Nuclear Fuel Complex in Hyderabad.
- Tarapur atomic power plant.
- Rajasthan Atomic Power Station.
- Both units at Kudankulam.
- Kakrapar Atomic Power Station.
Analysis and comments of critics/experts regarding India’s move of signing an “Additional protocol” with the IAEA
- US think-tank the Carnegie Endowment stated that India sees its ratification of its Additional Protocol as an arrow in its quiver supporting its quest for NSG membership.
- Critics of India's nuclear programme have said the pact fails to address concerns of proliferation as India could get its foot in the door of a club of countries that trade in nuclear materials without first signing a treaty that seeks to curb the spread of nuclear weapons.
- Stockholm International Peace Research Institute expert stated that, India has a clean track record on non-proliferation although it is not a signatory to NPT, which New Delhi terms as discriminatory. So there would be "no gain for nonproliferation".
- India's military nuclear programme is not subject to inspections by the IAEA, the United Nations nuclear watchdog, but it has never been accused of violating proliferation norms, unlike its neighbours Pakistan or China.
International Atomic Energy Agency
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) was established on 29 July 1957 to help nations develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.
The main role of IAEA is the administration of safeguards arrangements to provide assurance to the international community that individual countries are honoring their commitments under the treaty.
Even though IAEA established under its own international treaty, the IAEA reports to both the United Nations General Assembly and the Security Council.
The IAEA regularly inspects civil nuclear facilities to verify the accuracy of documentation supplied to it.
The agency checks inventories, and samples and analyzes materials.
Safeguards are designed to deter diversion of nuclear material by increasing the risk of early detection.
They are complemented by controls on the export of sensitive technology from countries such as UK and United States through voluntary bodies such as the Nuclear Suppliers Group.
The main concern of the IAEA is that uranium not be enriched beyond what is necessary for commercial civil plants, and that plutonium which is produced by nuclear reactors is not refined into a form that would be suitable for bomb production.
Scope of safeguards
Traditional safeguards are arrangements to account for and control the use of nuclear materials.
This verification is a key element in the international system which ensures that uranium in particular is used only for peaceful purposes.
Signatory parties/states to the (Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty) NPT agree to accept technical safeguard measures applied by the IAEA.
These require that operators of nuclear facilities maintain and declare detailed accounting records of all movements and transactions involving nuclear material.
Over 550 facilities and several hundred other locations are subject to regular inspection, and their records and the nuclear material being audited.
Inspections by the IAEA are complemented by other measures such as surveillance cameras and instrumentation.
The inspections act as an alert system providing a warning of the possible diversion of nuclear material from peaceful activities.
The system relies on-
Material Accountancy- Tracking all inward and outward transfers and the flow of materials in any nuclear facility.
This includes sampling and analysis of nuclear material, on-site inspections, and review and verification of operating records.
Physical Security- Restricting access to nuclear materials at the site.
Containment and Surveillance- use of seals, automatic cameras and other instruments to detect unreported movement or tampering with nuclear materials, as well as spot checks on-site.
All NPT non-weapons states must accept these full-scope safeguards.
In the five weapons states plus the non-NPT states (India, Pakistan and Israel), facility-specific safeguards apply.
IAEA inspectors regularly visit these facilities to verify completeness and accuracy of records.
The terms of the NPT cannot be enforced by the IAEA itself, nor can nations be forced to sign the treaty. In reality, as shown in Iraq and North Korea, safeguards can be backed up by diplomatic, political and economic measures.
While traditional safeguards easily verified the correctness of formal declarations by suspect states, in the 1990s attention turned to what might not have been declared.
While accepting safeguards at declared facilities, Iraq had set up elaborate equipment elsewhere in an attempt to enrich uranium to weapons grade.
North Korea attempted to use research reactors (not commercial electricity-generating reactors) and a reprocessing plant to produce some weapons-grade plutonium.
The weakness of the NPT regime lay in the fact that no obvious diversion of material was involved.
The uranium used as fuel probably came from indigenous sources, and the nuclear facilities were built by the countries themselves without being declared or placed under safeguards.
Iraq, as an NPT party, was obliged to declare all facilities but did not do so. Nevertheless, the activities were detected and brought under control using international diplomacy. In Iraq, a military defeat assisted this process.
In North Korea, the activities concerned took place before the conclusion of its NPT safeguards agreement.
With North Korea, the promised provision of commercial power reactors appeared to resolve the situation for a time, but it later withdrew from the NPT and declared it had nuclear weapons.
Additional Protocol
In 1993 a program was initiated to strengthen and extend the classical safeguards system, and a model protocol was agreed by the IAEA Board of Governors 1997.
The measures boosted the IAEA's ability to detect undeclared nuclear activities, including those with no connection to the civil fuel cycle.
Innovations were of two kinds.
- Some could be implemented on the basis of IAEA's existing legal authority through safeguards agreements and inspections.
- Others required further legal authority to be conferred through an Additional Protocol.
This must be agreed by each non-weapons state with IAEA, as a supplement to any existing comprehensive safeguards agreement. Weapons states have agreed to accept the principles of the model additional protocol.
Key elements of the model Additional Protocol:
- The IAEA is to be given considerably more information on nuclear and nuclear-related activities, including R & D, production of uranium and thorium (regardless of whether it is traded), and nuclear-related imports and exports.
- IAEA inspectors will have greater rights of access. This will include any suspect location, it can be at short notice (e.g., two hours), and the IAEA can deploy environmental sampling and remote monitoring techniques to detect illicit activities.
- States must streamline administrative procedures so that IAEA inspectors get automatic visa renewal and can communicate more readily with IAEA headquarters.
Further evolution of safeguards is towards evaluation of each state, taking account of its particular situation and the kind of nuclear materials it has. This will involve greater judgement on the part of IAEA and the development of effective methodologies which reassure NPT States.
As of 20 December 2010, 139 countries have signed Additional Protocols, 104 have brought them into force, and one (Iraq) is implementing its protocol provisionally.
The IAEA is also applying the measures of the Additional Protocol in Taiwan.
Among the leading countries that have not signed the Additional Protocol are Egypt, which says it will not sign until Israel accepts comprehensive IAEA safeguards, and Brazil, which opposes making the protocol a requirement for international cooperation on enrichment and reprocessing, but has not ruled out signing.
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
At present, 189 countries are States Parties to the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, more commonly known as the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty or NPT.
These include the five Nuclear Weapons States (NWS) recognized by the NPT:
- People's Republic of China.
- France.
- Russian Federation.
- United Kingdom.
- United States.
Notable non-signatories to the NPT are
- Israel.
- Pakistan.
- India.
(India and Pakistan have tested nuclear weapons, while Israel is considered by most to be an unacknowledged nuclear weapons state).
North Korea was once a signatory but withdrew in January 2003.
The legality of North Korea's withdrawal is debatable but as of 9 October 2006, North Korea clearly possesses the capability to make a nuclear explosive device.
2 remaining N-reactors to go under IAEA safeguards by year-end
India is completing the process of putting its 14 civilian nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards by the year end as part of a commitment made under the Indo-US nuclear deal.
The Narora Atomic Power plant Unit I and II (NAPS) in Bulandshahr district of Uttar
Pradesh is thus set to go under International Atomic Energy Agency(IAEA) safeguards.
Both units combined have capacity 220MW Pressurised Heavy Water Reactors (PHWR).
NAPS I was commissioned in January, 1991, while NAPS II became operational in July, 1992.
This move of India is being considered as commitment to becoming a responsible nuclear-weapon state.
More importantly, by complying with all the norms under the Indo-US nuclear deal India will also push for becoming a member of the coveted 45-member Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG).
India in its communication to IAEA in July, 2008, entitled, 'Implementation of the India-
United States Joint Statement of July 18, 2005: India's Separation Plan', had listed the 14 reactors which would be brought under IAEA safeguards from 2006 to 2014. The separation plan clearly demarcated facilities for civilian and military purpose.
The Additional Protocol, signed between India and IAEA on March 15, 2009, involves a high degree of scrutiny of nuclear facilities, including its reactors and fuel cycle sites, by the inspectors of the atomic energy body.
India has already listed its sites as agreed between the two countries.
The six facilities which were put under safeguards in October, 2009 are
- Two Uranium Oxide Plants.
- Ceramic Fuel Fabrication Plant.
- Enriched Uranium Oxide Plant.
- Enriched fuel fabrication plant.
- Gadolinia facility -- in the Nuclear Fuel Complex in Hyderabad.
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